Governmental Deception In Consent Searches by Warner, Richard E.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 1 Article 5 
11-1-1979 
Governmental Deception In Consent Searches 
Richard E. Warner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard E. Warner, Governmental Deception In Consent Searches, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 57 (1979) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol34/iss1/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
COMMENTS
Governmental Deception In Consent Searches
RICHARD E. WARNER*
Fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures has long been held a barrier to the use of
trickery by the government; yet government officials, in their
combat against modern sophisticated crimes, have voiced a need
to employ some types of misrepresentation. Governmental decep-
tion, once forbidden by by the courts, has become a common
occurrence. The author discusses the tension created by this cir-
cumstance and traces the solutions offered by the courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One unsettled question in the area of law enforcement is the
extent to which government officials may use deception to gain
access to private premises. Machiavelli and his latter-day counter-
parts suggest that the Prince may, or even must, employ whatever
* Former member, University of Miami Law Review; Associate with Cunningham, Al-
britton, Bee, Lenzi & Schiller, P.A., Marathon, Florida.
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deceit and trickery is necessary to maintain order among and power
over his subjects.' Stability in government during the Renaissance
was something of a luxury and therefore even gross deceit was a
small price to pay for the maintenance of the public peace.
Ostensibly, however, the relationship between government and
governed has matured since then, at least in the United States. Both
criminal and civil penalties in our present law reflect an almost
universal distaste for deception by government officials. Events of
this past decade indicate that even the highest government officials
are subject to penalties for fraud, obstruction of justice and other
deceptive activities. 2 Statutes requiring financial disclosure and
sunshine laws reflect a growing popular aversion to fraudulent tac-
tics by political figures.' Moreover, both state and federal courts
may not, in many instances, admit evidence obtained illegally.
4
The cohesiveness of this concept of governmental integrity
breaks down when it becomes apparent that many illegal activities
cannot be thwarted and punished without the use of some form of
governmental deception.5 Popular and legal support for undercover
police work, intrigue, and investigative activities short of entrap-
1. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND OTHER WORKS (University classics ed. 1941) (Italy
1513): "A prudent ruler, therefore, cannot and should not observe faith when such observance
is to his disadvantage and the causes that made him give his promise have vanished." Id. at
148.
2. See B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT's MEN (1974); B. WOODWARD
& C. BERNSTEIN, FINAL DAYS (1976); D. RATHER & G.P. GATES, PALACE GUARD (1974).
For the sake of avoiding unnecessary repetiton, this comment will use a variety of words
to convey the idea of deception such as misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, ruse, trickery and
guile. As noted later in the comment, the legal and vernacular nuances in meaning between
these terms disappear when they are used in the context of consent searches. See, e.g.,
Radowick v. State, 145 Ga. App. 231, 244 S.E.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1978); State v. Blackburn, 6
N.C. App. 510, 170 S.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1969).
3. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8. A means for sustaining public trust in officials, Florida's
"Sunshine Amendment" provides for public disclosure of the financial interests of candidates
for elective constitutional offices. In addition, it requires disclosure of campaign financing,
restitution to the state for private gain derived through a breach of the public trust, forfeiture
of state retirement benefits upon the conviction of a felony, and the establishment of an
independent commission on ethics.
4. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text infra.
5. C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 223-33 (1976); M. HARNEY & J.
CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 24-30 (1968).
Advanced domestic intelligence activities were recommended as vital to the future secu-
rity of public officials by THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY, REPORT (1964) [hereinafter cited as THE WARREN REPORT]; PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY passim (1971); see A. KORNBLUM,
THE MORAL HAZARDS 10-45 (1976); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 91-97 (1966).
See also F. EGEN, PLAINCLOTHESMAN 15-26 (1952); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1094 (1951); Note, Judicial
Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 944, 946-52 (1967).
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ment, continues today as it has for centuries.'
The coexistence of these two contradictory legal concepts cre-
ates significant legal tension. A focal point for this tension has been
the issue of consent as it relates to the fourth amendment prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures.7 It is settled law
that one may forego his fourth amendment rights by voluntarily
consenting to a search or seizure without prior warning of his right
to refuse.' If, however, a court decides that the consent was involun-
6. Primitive authority often cited as support for the use of covert police tactics is the
command to Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Canaan. Numbers 13:1. The need
for limited police deception is codified in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10(3) (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959), which provides, "The defense [of entrapment] afforded by this section is unavailable
in a prosecution for a crime involving conduct causing or threatening bodily injury to a person
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment."
The acceptance of such deception is also exemplified by a question given in a United
States Civil Service examination, administered on May 18, 1974, for qualification to the
status of "Investigator." The question read:
23. "The Investigator is justified in misleading the interviewee only when, in the
Investigator's judgment, this is clearly required by the problem being investi-
gated." Such a practice is
(A) necessary; there are times when complete honesty will impede a
successful investigation
(B) unnecessary; such a tactic is unethical and should never be em-
ployed
(C) necessary; an investigator must be guided by success rather than
ethical considerations in an investigation
(D) unnecessary; it is clearly doubtful whether such a practice will
help the investigator conclude the investigation successfully.
Reprinted in D. TURNER, DETECTIVE INVESTIGATOR 35 (1973). The correct answer was (A).
See also A. BOUZA, POLICE INTELLIGENCE 66-69 (1976) (historical discussion of New York
City's Bureau of Special Services Investigations (BOSSI), organized in 1912 as the "Radical
Bureau" to infiltrate socialist groups); V. LEONARD, THE POLICE DErECTIVE FUNCTION 32-33
(1970); M. OVPENBERG, THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS 154-59 (1962) (traces the development of
federal undercover activities against narcotics traffic).
7. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As a matter of convenience in this comment, the term "fourth
amendment" will signify not only the limitations upon the federal government as expressed
in that amendment, but also the same limitations upon the states by virtue of the incorpora-
tion of the fourth amendment into the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
8. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Supreme Court of the United
States cast the criterion of valid consent in terms of "voluntariness." The issue in the
Schneckloth case was whether knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to a search is a
prerequisite to a valid consent. The Court, in holding it was not required, said a factual
finding that consent was voluntarily given was to be based on the totality of circumstances
surrounding the consent. Knowledge by the consenting party of his right was just one factor
to be considered. The Court refused to mandate prior warnings for consent searches under
19791
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tary, any search based solely upon such consent will be deemed void
under the fourth amendment? Because illegally obtained evidence
may not be admissible at trial, 0 the validity of the consent will
many times determine the viability of the subsequent prosecution.
Tension surrounding this consent rule arises when government
officials feel compelled to use deception to gain the consent of pro-
spective criminal defendants for entry into private premises. If the
consent effects an official entry into private areas not accessible by
the general public, the fourth amendment will usually apply."
When law enforcement officers enter the premises and witness ille-
gal activity, they will necessarily make some form of search and
seizure, whether it be a physical taking or simply the view of an
interior room and the aural reception of statements spoken. A prob-
lem arises in that there is often not sufficient probable cause to
support a search warrant or exigent search." The government agents
must then rely solely on the express or implied consent of the pro-
spective defendants in order to gain access to the private areas
where the crimes are committed. The quandary of the agents is
apparent. If they attempt to procure a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the consentor's rights, their investigation will quickly ter-
minate. Rather than forfeit law enforcement, the agents might in-
duce the prospective defendants to believe they are potential partic-
the fourth amendment as it had for in-custody interrogations under the fifth and sixth
amendments. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the holding of Schneckloth
encompasses only the issue of "knowledge of right to refuse," the justices reached their
holding by changing the definition-of valid consent. They rejected the "knowing and intelli-
gent" definition of consent previously required for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and stated that consent need only be "voluntary." The Court
discussed the word "voluntary" only in contradistinction to the idea of coercion. Because
deception is not truly a form of coercion and because the idea of "voluntariness" does not
definitionally exclude the possibility of valid deception in obtaining consent, one might
conjecture that the Schneckloth definition of consent has, at least through dictum, validated
consent gained by ruse. Whether this accurately reflects the Court's view of governmental
misrepresentation in consent searches will be debatable until the Court finally settles the
matter.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, has routinely given such warnings to
prospective consenting parties. See Note, Consent Searchers: A Reappraisal After Miranda
v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 143 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For
two critical examinations of the exclusionary rule, see Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) and Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free
if the Constable Blunders, 50 TEXAs L. REV. 736 (1972).
11. See notes 26-35 and accompanying text infra. The equivocation in text is prompted
by the vague explanation of fourth amendment protection in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
12. See notes 26-35 and 37-39 and accompanying text infra.
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ipants in the crime. The agents then become privy to the criminal
events and are able to recount the incidents or produce the seized
evidence later at the prosecution. Although this system seems vir-
tually institutionalized in this country, 3 its validity is not clear in
light of the rule that consent must be voluntary."
Before the advent of the fourth amendment exclusionary rules,
the validity of consent to searches was seldom litigated, although
the allied, but completely distinct, concept of entrapment had been
well defined as a criminal defense. 5 The announcement of the fed-
eral exclusionary rule in 1914, however, provided the necessary mo-
tivation for litigating the issue of governmental misrepresentation
in consent searches. 6 Thereafter, states randomly introduced their
own exclusionary rules until 1961 when the Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio7 made the rule mandatory under the federal model.
The first federal cases dealing with deception in consent
searches were governed by a strict view of the issue and held that
any consent dependent on deceit or misrepresentation was vi-
tiated.18 This view was based on the clearly intrusive effect of such
13. A. BouzA, supra note 6; P. MANNING, POuCE WORK 180-83 (1977); see S. DASH, THE
EAVESDROPPERS 253-56 (1971) (assumes constitutional validity); D. SCHuvTz & L. NORTON,
POLICE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 117-27 (1968). See generally R. HICKS, UNDERCOVER OPERA-
TIONS AND PERSUASION (1973); C. MOTTO, UNDERCOVER (1971).
The system is rather prevalent in Great Britain also, as a plainclothes police officer
recounted:
[One night] we planned to search a flat occupied by a suspected (convicted) drug
dealer. We did not have a search warrant. We "talked our way in" by asking if
we could come in and simultaneously showing badges (I was told to flash anything
that "looked official" and produced my American Express Card on cue) ... The
flat renter asked presently to see our search warrant. The sergeant said, "Under
paragraph 721 of the Police General Orders-Criminal Code, officers are not
required to show a warrant during a preliminary investigation." He told me later,
"people never listen to you and believe what a copper says about the law." He
explained that he always refers to some fictitious passage in the code and quotes
it if asked.
P. MANNING, supra, at 182.
14. If the word "voluntary" as it is used in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), means simply that consent was not coerced, there is no longer any question that all
types of governmental deception may be used to gain entry into private premises. This
comment proceeds on the assumption that the word is not construed so broadly.
15. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Roberts said, "[slociety is at war with the criminal classes, and courts have uniformly held
that [the government] may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of the
commission of crime." Id. at 453-54. Because the issue in Sorrells was entrapment, the forms
of deception involved did not necessarily, implicate fourth amendment issues. For a contrast
of the two ideas, see notes 65-72 and accompanying text infra. See United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
19791
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searches and the close analogies to it in tort law. 9 State courts later
followed suit.20
As the twentieth century wore on, it appeared that some forms
of governmental deceit were appropriate if not absolutely necessary
for the enforcement of certain laws.2' This was underscored by the
emergence of powerful organized crime syndicates, terrorist groups
and sophisticated narcotics rings.12 The process of rationalizing de-
ception by undercover agents was relatively simple under the flexi-
ble due process standards of entrapment;2 3 however, the stringent
restrictions on misrepresentation in consent searches proved trou-
blesome. Resolution of the conflict was attempted in a series of cases
before the Supreme Court, culminating in United States v. White. 4
While ostensibly allowing undercover agents to use deception to
gain entry into private premises, the cases were imprecise in their
effect upon the consent rule. Instead of simply creating an exception
to the consent rule accommodating undercover searches, the cases
introduced an approach to fourth amendment consent which, as
evidenced by later lower court decisions,2 5 has virtually eliminated
the restrictions on governmental deception.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the historical
restrictions on the use of governmental misrepresentation in consent
searches. This discussion will also analyze judicial attempts to fit
the undercover investigation into the consent scheme and the alter-
ations to the consent rule attendant thereon. The comment will
finally suggest a more useful standard by which courts will be able
to accommodate limited deception by government agents without
eliminating the consent rule.
616 (1886), the Court alluded to allied fourth amendment concepts in a discussion of,com-
pelled testimony via printed documents under the fifth amendment. See United States v.
Bloom, 6 F.2d 584, 585 (D. Mass. 1925) (cites Gouled as authority for restricting deception
in procuring consent).
19. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
20. See, e.g., People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391 P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1964);
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963).
21. M. OTFENBERG, supra note 6; see Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-10 (1966)
(deception used to enforce narcotics laws).
22. A. BOUZA, supra note 6, at 8-25.
23. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (It is only when the government
actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of
entrapment is available). See also, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1965); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1957); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
24. 401 U.S. 475 (1971).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Locklear, 237 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS
A. The Warrant Requirement
Reasonableness is the heart of the fourth amendment limita-
tion on the ability of the government to enter into and search private
areas.2" To help ensure the reasonableness of searches, the latter
part of the amendment, dealing with the issuance of warrants, has
been read into the former so as to require in most instances warrants
based upon probable cause." To effectuate the warrant process,
courts have interpreted probable cause to mean the point at which
there is substantial reason to believe that evidence of a crime exists
at a particular location.n A neutral magistrate may issue a warrant
whether based upon sworn testimony before him or upon an affida-
vit if he feels probable cause exists."
The scope or reach of the fourth amendment limitation defines
its applicability. If an otherwise illegal search or seizure is commit-
ted outside of the sphere of fourth amendment protection, the
search or seizure will not be branded illegal.30 In the past, the scope
of the amendment followed property concepts. 31 A person was to be
protected from intrusion in private spheres such as the home or
office. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in Katz
26. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution declares, "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . " U.S. CONST. amend IV (emphasis added).
27. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). In Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948), the Court invalidated a warrantless search although probable cause existed
had the officers chosen to procure a warrant. The Court's delineation of several exceptions to
the warrant requirement in Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107 n.2, underscored the rule that if there
exists the ability to procure a warrant, it must be procured. See United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). The Court expressed the same preference for arrest warrants in Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Nonetheless, a threshold finding of probable cause must exist to
validate even a warrantless search or seizure. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959). See generally Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
28. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Although affidavits supporting
search warrants may be based on hearsay evidence, they must at minimum provide the
magistrate with the circumstances relied upon by the person providing the basic information
and the circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was reliable.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
29. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 933.07 (1977); N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 690.40 (McKinney 1970).
30. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 393 n.6 (1971); Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
31. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928) (fourth amendment protection held not to attach until government officials tres-
pass upon the aggrieved party's property; therefore, electronic eavesdropping through a wall
was not illegal). But cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (Electronic
eavesdropping through a heating duct was considered illegal as "unauthorized physical pene-
tration into the premises . . ").
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v. United States32 altered the reach of the amendment beyond pro-
prietary boundaries. It achieved this by defining the protected area
as any transactional sphere wherein there exists a reasonable ex-
pectancy of privacy on the part of the persons involved.
33
As pronounced in Katz, the subjective nature of the definition
was intended to expand the reach of the fourth amendment beyond
proprietorial boundaries. After Katz, the locale is not as important
a factor in determining the scope of the amendment as is the nature
of the activity and interests of the participants in the transaction.
The word "reasonable", howevei, again may allow expansion or
contraction of the reach of the amendment. In this respect, Katz
and its progeny allow a trial judge a degree of discretion in applying
the fourth amendment in search and seizure cases.34 It is, however,
safe to presume in light of interim case law that the traditional
fourth amendment protection of persons, homes, offices and papers
will remain viable, with occasional extensions of protection to areas
such as phone booths and public restrooms .3
B. The Plain View Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine is an important judicial rule en-
grafted upon the fourth amendment, and thus plays an important
role in consent analysis. The doctrine holds that where evidence is
located in a constitutionally protected area, but is viewed by a
government official whose vantage point was assumed legally, the
observation itself is not illegal under the fourth amendment. 3 The
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. The defendant in Katz made calls from a public telephone booth to which federal
agents had attached a listening and recording device. Katz was convicted of illegally trans-
mitting wagering information on the basis of the recorded statements made in the telephone
conversations. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the use of the statements
because there had been no physicial intrusion into the area occupied by the defendant as he
made his calls. 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966). On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States brought the protection of the fourth amendment to the defendant's conversations
although there could have been no physical trespass. Katz's conviction was reversed upon the
exclusion of the recorded statements. 389 U.S. 347.
34. E.g., Marshall v. Western Waterproofing Co., 560 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1977) (no expec-
tation of privacy in outdoor scaffolding); United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir.
1977) (justifiable expectation of privacy in motel room); United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1977) (patrolman's locker in police headquarters reasonably relied upon as pri-
vate).
35. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968 (1968).
36. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). In Harris, a police officer, rolling up a
window in an impounded automobile, saw a registration card lying on the car door frame.
The Court held the card admissable because it was discovered by the officer who had a right
to be in the position to make the visual observation. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 560
[Vol. 34:57
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evidence found in "plain view" may be admitted at trial or used to
establish probable cause. For example, if a police officer observes,
through the window of a parked automobile, contraband within the
vehicle, the view itself is legal because the officer's vantage point
was assumed without illegal entry into any protected area. If exigent
circumstances are present, an immediate search may be justified on
the basis of probable cause engendered by the view. If an immediate
search is not required, the view could supply the probable cause
necessary to obtain a search warrant to seize the contraband.
C. Exigent Circumstances
As suggested, a warrant is not required if probable cause exists,
but exigent circumstances arise which make obtaining a search war-
rant impracticable." This exception is a necessary corollary to the
rule that warrants must be procured when it is physically possible
without jeopardizing the opportunity to search.8 Probable cause is
nevertheless required even in exigent searches. 9
D. The Derivative Evidence Rule
The derivative evidence rule also impinges upon the issue of
fourth amendment consent." As a logical extension of the exclusion-
ary rule, this rule prohibits the prosecution from using evidence
F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. Worthington, 544
F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977). See also South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
37. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
38. See note 27 supra.
39. Id. Other exceptions to the warrant requirement exist, but do not arise often in the
context of consent by deception. The Court, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
permitted the search of the arrestee and his immediate surroundings to ensure the removal
of any weapons or tools of escape. Where the arrest involves removal of the arrestee for
confinement, the Court has held that a complete search of the person is reasonable. United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court has also permitted a very limited search
of "suspicious" individuals, commonly referred to as a "stop and frisk" search. If an officer
is led to believe that criminal activity may be afoot and upon confrontation with the individ-
ual nothing dispels the officer's suspicion and he reasonably fears for his own safety, he may
search the individual's outer clothing for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). When
vehicles are impounded, police may search them to secure any valuables, contraband or
weapons found therein. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Although not considered true searches for fourth amendment
purposes, entries to execute arrest warrants and to make arrests usually involve searches, and
most obviously, seizures. These entries are discussed as exceptions to the search warrant
requirement at note 107 infra.
40. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); see Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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procured indirectly from an unconstitutional search. If any evidence
obtained by an illegal search is thereafter used to procure additional
information, the information is "tainted" and thus inadmissible. An
illustration of the doctrine is when officials who illegally enter and
search private premises do not make the seizures and arrests at that
time, but leave the premises to procure a search warrant based on
information gained during their initial entry. Under the doctrine,
the warrant procured thereafter is defective and any evidence
gained under its authority is "tainted" with illegality and therefore
inadmissible." If, however, the eventual means of acquiring the
evidence are substantially distinct and causally removed from the
original illegality, the "taint" may be removed and the evidence
rendered admissable. 2
III. THE CONSENT RULES RESTRICTING DECEPTION
A. Gouled and Its Progeny
Although some commentators trace the history of consent anal-
ysis back to the 1600's with The Six Carpenters' Case,3 its true
beginning for fourth amendment purposes lies in some highly perva-
sive dicta in Gouled v. United States." Within the first decade of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court of the
United States faced in Gouled a set of facts that demanded abso-
lutely no consideration of consent by deception. Nevertheless, the
Court spoke to that issue and dicta emanating from the opinion
served as gospel for over forty years."
41. E.g., Fraternal Order of Eagles, No. 778 v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932).
42. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see United States v. Sor-Lokken,
557 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977); United States v. Mayes, 552
F.2d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 1977).
43. 8 Coke 146(a) (1611), reprinted in 77 Eng. Rep. 695. The carpenters complained
sucessfully that when the King's men were admitted legally, but later abused the license
granted them, they became trespassers ab initio. In effect, the later abuse rendered the earlier
consent to enter void. The argument was raised anew in McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S.
95 (1927), where federal officials entered the defendant's premises under a valid search war-
rant, and having discovered illegal alcohol upon executing the warrant, they proceeded to
destroy several gallons of the defendant's prime stock of whiskey. The Supreme Court sum-
marily rejected the argument of the Six Carpenters' Case on the ground that it had been
applied only against officials in civil tort actions, and never as a defense in criminal cases.
Nevertheless, the Six Carpenters' Case was again exhumed by the defense in On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952), and again rejected on the same ground.
44. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
45. See note 50 and accompanying text infra. The Court itself paid homage in the form
of limitation upon the Gouled dicta in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928).
Olmstead was overruled on other grounds in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 346 (1967). The
Court in Olmstead recognized the rule restricting governmental deception in consent searches
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The exact factual setting of the case proved important to the
Court when it was distinguished in later cases." Intelligence officials
in the Army, investigating the defendant for fraud, needed docu-
mentary evidence to aid in the eventual prosecution. Because the
officials knew Gouled had no idea that he was being investigated,
they enlisted a former acquaintance of his to pay a call on him.47
After gaining entry to Gouled's business office in the guise of a social
caller, the acquaintance searched for and seized incriminating docu-
ments while the defendant had momentarily left the room.
In finding the evidence illegally obtained under the fourth
amendment, the Court made a much quoted and often incorrectly
relied upon statement:
[I]t is impossible to successfully contend that a like search and
seizure would be a reasonable one if only admission were obtained
by stealth instead of by force or coercion.
• . . [WIhether entrance to the home or office of a person
suspected of crime be obtained by a [government agent] by
stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a busi-
ness call, and whether the owner be present or not when he enters,
any search and seizure subsequently and secretly made in his
absence, falls within the scope of the prohibition of the Fourth
Amendment."
According to the Court, because the only evidence taken and used
at trial was procured without any consent whatsoever, the prelimi-
nary misrepresentation was irrelevant to the finding of illegality in
the search. Had the acquaintance procured incriminating evidence
in conversation with the defendant or taken the papers with consent
prompted by the guise, however, the quoted statement would not-
have been dicta.'" Nevertheless, most lower courts up through the
mid-1960's considered the dicta binding.'"
as supposedly stated in Gouled, but limited the Gouled "holding" to documentary evidence.
For examples of lower courts which either in dicta or holding followed the consent rule in the
Gouled dicta, see Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789, 791 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Fraternal
Order of Eagles, No. 778 v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d'Cir. 1932); United States v. General
Pharmacal Co., 205 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1962)..
46. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209-11 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1963).
47. For a discussion concerning the determination of an agency relationship, see notes
73-80 and accompanying text infra. In Gouled, the "acquaintance" was a private in the army.
48. 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921).
49. The words spoken would have been the objects seized and those would have been
exposed to seizure only through the consent given the acquaintance to enter. Hence, consent
would have been the matter at issue in the case and the Court's decision would have included
the discussion of the deception as a necessary component, not as dicta.
50. E.g., Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other
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B. Coercion Compared
In light of even modern definitions of consent under the fourth
amendment, the Gouled dicta presents a logical formulation of the
consent rules concerning misrepresentation. Consent that is coaxed
by deception ought to be no more effectual than consent prompted
by coercion. As to coercion, the Court has never receded from hold-
ing that consent acquired through show of force by authorities will
not support a search entirely dependent upon that consent. In
Bumper v. North Carolina,5 the Court restated that principle in a
factual context which resembled consent through deception, rather
than through coercion.
In order to gain entrance to a private dwelling without the aid
of a search warrant, the state law enforcement officials in Bumper
untruthfully led the owner to believe they had a search warrant.
Believing the officers' statement, the owner thought a search would
be inevitable, and thus consented. The Court could have viewed this
in terms of either misrepresentation or coercion. The police had no
warrant, 2 yet they falsely stated that they did-an affirmative,
material misrepresentation which was relied upon by the consenting
party.53 Viewed in a different light, however, the officials ap-
proached the owner with a show of authority and force which
strongly suggested a coercive effect upon the consent. The Supreme
Court viewed it as coercion and held that the consent was vitiated.'
C. Allied Concepts in Tort and Criminal Law
The Court's dicta in Gouled was strongly justified by the tradi-
tional abhorrence in tort and criminal law for fraud and misrepre-
sentation.55 The analogies and nexus to tort law consent were
grounds sub nor. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); United States v. Guerrina, 112 F.
Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1933);
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963). But see Chieftain Pontiac Corp.
v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum).
Even after the undercover cases of the 1960's attempted to narrow the Gouled dicta to
virtual oblivion, see notes 142-71 and accompanying text infra, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1977), still maintained
that the consent rule of Gouled was good law. Accord, United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d
151, 159 (2d Cir. 1965) (consent rule stated in dicta), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024 (1966); see
Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
51. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
52. Because the State averred that it was not relying on a warrant for the search, the
Court decided the case on the premise that none existed. Id. at 546.
53. See notes 73-80 and accompanying text infra.
54. 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
55. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971). The aversion to fraud in criminal
law exists in both state and federal statutes. The broad reach and severe penalties of these
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strong." Consent to an intentional tort such as battery must be
"informed" 5 so as to render it as similarly "intelligent" or
"knowing" as that in the previous definition of consent. 58
As in fourth amendment consent, the rule developed early in
tort law that when consent is procured through deceit or negligent
misrepresentation, the consent is ineffectual. In such cases, consent
cannot be a valid defense to the tort. The classic case of De May v.
Roberts"5 clearly illustrates the point. The case concerned assault
and battery upon a woman undergoing childbirth. A physician was
summoned to her home. Because it was a stormy evening and the
physician was weary, he asked his friend, Mr. Scattergood, to help
him carry his instruments. Scattergood was an unmarried man
"utterly ignorant of the practice of medicine. . . ,,0 Upon reaching
the woman's home, the physician introduced Scattergood to her
husband as a "friend [who came] along to help . . . ."" The hus-
band said "all right"62 and seemed satisfied with the state of affairs.
At the physician's request, an allegedly reluctant Scattergood held
the woman's hand and observed the medical examination and treat-
laws are reflected in the Florida provisions, which attempt to punish every type of deceit from
the misleading use of the word "free," to the fraudulent decapitation of animals. Compare
FLA. STAT. § 817.55 (1977) with id. § 817.27.
56. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979). This section with Comment
states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), consent to conduct of another is effective
for all consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any interests resulting
from it.
(2) If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by
a substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the
extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other
or is induced by the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the
unexpected invasion or harm.
(3) Consent is not effective if it is given under duress.
Comment:
a. This Section is concerned only with the effect of fraud, mistake
or duress as invalidating the consent, rendering it ineffective and enti-
tling the plaintiff to maintain any tort action that would be available
to him if the consent had not been given. Thus if he is induced by the
fraud, mistake or duress to consent to a harmful or offensive contact
with his person, he may maintain an action for battery; and if he is
induced to surrender goods, he may recover for conversion.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at 105-07.
57. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958). See Plante,
An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1968).
58. See note 8 supra.
59. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 162, 9 N.W. at 147.
62. Id.
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ment. Upon learning that Scattergood was not a medical student or
physician, the husband and wife sued for assault, battery and what
appears to be breach of privacy. In response to the defense of con-
sent, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that the initial consent
to the presence and actions of Scattergood was defeated by the
"deceit" used in procuring the consent." Although the failure of the
physician to inform the plaintiffs of Scattergood's true character
could at worst be deemed negligent misrepresentation, the consent
was nonetheless obviated.
The intentional tort concept of fraud combined with the deriva-
tive tort consent rule stated above provided courts following the
Gouled dicta with a substantial policy argument. Owing to the con-
genital gullibility of American society, the strategic advantage of
using police plants inside premises not open to the public would
create an imbalance in the fight against crime. The advantage is
even more pronounced where the undercover agents do not partici-
pate in the commission of the crimes. The wrongdoer, of course,
ought not be provided with rules of the game designed only to pro-
vide sporting chances. The strength and importance of fourth
amendment limitations, however, simply could not be reconciled
with the interior surveillance possible without restrictions on the use
of deception. The rules of consent, on the other hand, provided a
relatively clear standard by which to judge surveillance advan-
tages." Even more importantly, they were well established legal
concepts with simple applicability.
63. Id. at 165, 9 N.W. at 149.
64. Under the pre-Katz proprietary "scope" of the fourth amendment, discussed at note
31 supra, there emerged the logically necessary "public access" postulate. It held that those
areas of one's premises which are open to the public under implied or express invitation, such
as a commercial business, are not within the scope of the fourth amendment. Because the
average citizen could walk in from the street, there was no sense in restricting government
officials from doing the same thing. In United States v. Bloom, 6 F.2d 584 (D. Mass. 1925), a
prohibition agent wandered into a commercial junk yard during business hours and discov-
ered illegal alcohol. The court found the fourth amendment offered no protection. The prob-
lem has recurred in more recent cases dealing with publicly shown X-rated movies. Moody
v. Thrush Corp., 33 Ohio Misc. 84, 91-92, 291 N.E.2d 922, 926 (Ct. C.P. 1972). See also United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Similar rules emerged in this regard, called the "open fields" and "curtilage" doctrines,
which allowed officials without a warrant to enter into areas of land or buildings not in close
proximity to the dwelling or family sphere of a given premises. See Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924). Although the public access doctrines underlay Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966), the Katz decision has greatly limited their application. See McDowell
v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967). For facility in reference, the expression
"consent rule" will mean the rule developed by case law restricting the government's use of
deception to gain consent for entry into areas reasonably relied upon as private.
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D. The Entrapment Rules Distinguished
The consent rules concerning misrepresentation have become
closely intertwined, with the rules of entrapment. 5 While it may
seem reprehensible that government agents might use "dirty tricks"
to gain entry to a private area, it may seem all the more obnoxious
that the same agents, once inside, coax and goad the prospective
defendant into committing a crime. The deception is then woven
into a much more complex ruse, typically involving compounded
misrepresentations as to the agent's identity or purposes. The quan-
tum and quality of the deceit used in such an "entrapment" seems
most insidious, yet under most decisions dealing with entrapment
rules, these misrepresentations are not considered violative of any
constitution or statute." Unless the government agents plant the
seed of intent67 to commit the crime, all the histrionics and induce-
ments they can muster will not serve as a defense against the crime
when it is committed.
The entrapment doctrine is less sensitive to the effects of gov-
ernmental misrepresentation than the consent rules under the
fourth amendment, for several legal and policy reasons. Most im-
portantly, the entrapment doctrine does not comprehend, in itself,
the ability of government agents to enter into private property or
areas imbued with a reasonable expectation of privacy. It simply
stands for the premise that government agents may play along with
the defendants and coax them into committing crimes. The only
constitutional limitation upon this activity may lie in the require-
ment of due process. 8 This limitation, however, is surmounted by
showing the activity is fundamentally fair or reasonable. Where no
fundamental rights are involved, the courts are willing to allow a
wide range of deceptive tactics by police. Therefore, so long as the
fourth amendment is not implicated, encouragements by govern-
ment agents short of "planting the seed" are constitutional."
The close connection between the entrapment doctrine and the
65. E.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). But see Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
66. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (defendant only need harbor a
"predisposition" to commit the charged offense to render the defense void). Further, the
Court held that entrapment will not raise constitutional issues unless the government's con-
duct becomes "shocking to the universal sense of justice" so as to violate due process. Id. at
431-32.
67. Id. at 436.
68. Id. at 431-32.
69. See generally Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement: Lewis v.
United States and Beyond, 4 Hous. L. REV. 609 (1967).
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consent rule became apparent during the development of the under-
cover exception to the consent rule. In Lewis v. United States, the
government argued strenuously that misrepresentation was author-
ized historically by the courts.70 For the most part, however, they
cited to cases involving only entrapment concepts." The argument
became, in effect, that the fourth amendment does not protect indi-
viduals from breaches of trust and that it does not provide a privi-
lege against disclosure of anything said or done within a home.
Invariably, the position stressed the breakdown of law and order
without a prerogative to use deception.7 The logical end to the
argument was that the standards of entrapment should envelop and
subsume the consent rule. That argument may well have prevailed.
E. The Government Action Requirement
Courts and commentators alike have failed on occasion to dis-
tinguish in consent cases the difference between governmental and
nongovernmental action. Constitutional claims may only be recog-
nized against governmental action, whether state or federal.73
Therefore, fourth amendment limitations are applicable only where
the search or seizure is contrived and executed by the government
through its various agents. Although a nongovernmental search by
a private citizen may involve criminal and civil penalties, and in
some instances render evidence inadmissable by statute," it never-
theless does not carry any constitutional implication.
Once the government establishes an agency relationship with
a private individual, any activities done by the person within the
scope of that agency will be considered governmental action7" and
will almost invariably implicate constitutional limitations. The de-
termination of an agency relationship is a question of fact, and
because it is most often determined at the threshold of the suppres-
sion hearing, the findings of fact are usually made by the court and
not the jury. Therefore, when the trial court finds as a matter of fact
that no agency relationship existed between an informant and the
70. Brief for Respondent at 6-11, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
71. Id. at 7-11.
72. Id. at 18-22.
73. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). The Court in Burdeau stated, "[The
fourth amendment isi a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies . . . ." Id. at 475.
74. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.01-.10 (Supp. 1978) (inadmissibility of evidence gained
through illegal wiretap).
75. See People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955); People v. Scott, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 733, 117 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Ct. App. 1974).
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government, the fourth amendment claim is foreclosed."6
A unique example of this rule occurred in Hoffa v. United
States." The trial court found as a matter of fact that the informant
involved was not an agent of the government. 8 There was, therefore,
no governmental action and consequently no grounds for constitu-
tional challenge. The Supreme Court, however, opined at some
length upon the fourth, fifth and sixth amendment claims of the
defendant.' Because the Court did not overturn the trial court's
finding of no agency relationship, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the Hoffa opinion is almost totally dicta.80
F. Materiality
Although communications and assertive conduct may convey
false, misleading or imperfect information, consent will not be vi-
tiated by a misrepresentation unless it is material to the consent
decision. The test for materiality is basically one of legal relevancy.
If the misrepresentation could not have logically affected the deci-
sion for or against granting consent, it will not void that consent.
As in the analogous relevancy rules of evidence," the concept of
76. Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967). Thedefendant in Barnes left
his travel case in a motel room. The motel owner, on his own initiative, searched the travel
case and turned over the incriminating evidence found within to federal authorities. Follow-
ing Burdeau, the Fifth Circuit held the evidence admissible. See generally Sackler v. Sackler,
15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964) (admissible in a domestic relations
case); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
77. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). During a previous trial of the former Teamster leader, an ac-
quaintance, Partin, made periodic visits to the defendant's hotel suite and overheard incrimi-
nating statements concerning jury tampering. The federal agents forwarded cash to Partin
and accommodated his gathering of the information. At no time did Partin reveal his true
purposes to Hoffa or the other Teamster officials involved in the scheme to bribe the jurors.
In the subsequent trial for jury tampering, Hoffa claimed that Partin's evidence was procured
in violation of the fourth amendment. It was held, however, that Hoffa relied in making'
incriminating statements, not on the security of his hotel room, but on his misplaced confid-
ence that Partin would not reveal the scheme and therefore Hoffa was nonetheless convicted
primarily on the basis of Partin's testimony. Id. at 302.
78. United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 36 (6th Cir. 1965).
79. 385 U.S. 293, 301-12 (1966). See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
80. The Court stated:
The findings of the trial court support this version of the facts [that Partin was
not a government agent], and these findings were accepted by the Court of
Appeals as "supported by substantial evidence." 349 F.2d at 36. But whether or
not the Government "placed" Partin with Hoffa in Nashville during the Test
Fleet trial, we proceed upon the premise that Partin was a government informer
from the time he first arrived in Nashville on October 22, and that the Govern-
ment compensated him for his services as such. It is upon that premise that we
consider the constitutional issues presented.
385 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1966) (footnote omitted).
81. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed. 1972).
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materiality in consent questions reflects a logical connection tested
by the standard that the assertion must tend to influence the con-
sentor to grant consent. For example, an official's inaccuracy as to
the ultimate scope of the intended search may not prove detrimen-
tal to the consent if, while searching within the scope stated, the
agent sees in plain view an object to be seized. The plain view
doctrine by law extends the scope of the search;"2 therefore the mis-
statement has no relevance to the expansion of the search beyond
the stated limits.
In People v. Cioffi, 3 a New York trial court confronted the
situation where a police officer investigating sales of untaxed ciga-
rettes sought to search an area on the premises of a suspected ciga-
rette smuggler. Having spotted several packs of clearly untaxed4
cigarettes in open view, the officer told the proprietor that the ciga-
rettes were illegal and that he would "like to have the rest of
them.""5 The statement was inaccurate. Applicable New York law
allowed up to two cartons of untaxed cigarettes to be possessed in
the state." On the basis of that misrepresentation by the officer, the
proprietor immediately consented to the officer's search of the back
room where some 1700 cartons of untaxed cigarettes were kept.
The court in Cioffi correctly recognized that the officer's state-
ment was not truly accurate. Yet, it decided that the misstatement
was not a moving factor in the proprietor's decision to consent to
the search, and therefore was immaterial. The search was upheld. 7
This case illustrates the factual nature, of the question of material-
ity. The logical nexus in Cioffi between the misrepresentation and
the grant of consent could not reasonably be considered substantial.
Although it may be a psychological catharsis for some criminal
types to bare all guilt in an arrest situation, it is not a necessary
reaction or reasonably probable in the usual course of law enforce-
82. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
83. 81 Misc. 2d 1, 365 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
84. Although the packs bore the North Carolina tax stamp, they did not bear the New
York State stamp. Id. at 2, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
85. Id.
86. N.Y. TAx LAw § 471-a(3) (McKinney 1972).
87. 81 Misc. 2d 1, 9, 365 N.Y.S.2d 434, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The ultimate finding that
the consent had not been the result of the state agent's statements illustrates the basic
concept of materiality in consent. Beyond this, however, Cioffi illustrates to a limited extent
how the decision of the Supreme Court in Schneckloth, see note 8 supra, shifted the concern
in forth amendment consent simply to avoiding coercion. Deception is not necessarily coer-
cion unless it is accompanied by a show of force or authority. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391




ment.u Therefore, the result and rationale of Cioffi are correct under
the materiality standard stated.
G. Affirmativeness
The "affirmativeness" requirement for misrepresentation in
consent searches bears little similarity to any of the allied concepts
in tort law. Therefore, it provides some unique definitional and
logical problems of its own. Although a misrepresentation may be
material to a consent decision, it may not render a consend invalid
if it was not presented to the consentor in an affirmative manner.8
Thus, materiality may be distinguished as raising more a question
of causation than the affirmativeness standard which looks to the
form of the assertion. Affirmativeness is then an additional, yet less
distinct, threshold inquiry beyond materiality.
In order to be sufficiently affirmative to trigger invalidation of
consent, the misrepresentation must achieve a level of activity and
directness somewhat higher than that attained by assertions gener-
ally. Because all assertions are attempts to convey ideas by word or
action, affirmativeness for consent purposes must signify communi-
cation with a stronger element of intent than that of mere innuendo.
Elemental assertions whose communicative content is miniscule
will not meet the standard. An example often given to illustrate an
elemental assertion, is where a person with normal vision wears a
pair of dark sunglasses late at night. Except where identity is meant
to be concealed, the practice is ludicrous. The only motivation the
person could have for wearing the sunglasses would be to communi-
cate, in an ornamental way, his desire to be categorized with other
persons who wear. dark sunglasses late at night. To that extent, the
activity constitutes an assertion. The assertion, however, is of so
slight and vague a communicative nature, that its message ought
not to be deemed affirmative. The conclusion that an assertion is
sufficiently affirmative is reached upon a reasonable consideration
of the facts and circumstances of the incident.9 0
Case law indicates the intuitive nature of the standard. In
United States v. Lehman," the Internal Revenue Service sought to
88. See 81 Misc. 2d 1, 6-7, 365 N.Y.S.2d 434, 441-42.
89. See United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1971); cf. United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
943 (1971) (silence cannot be affirmative deception if there is no duty to speak). See generally
United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972).
90. As a question of fact, findings of the trial court may not be overturned if they were
supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 36 (6th Cir. 1965).
91. 468 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1973).
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investigate a certain taxpayer. Having neither a search warrant nor
an administrative summons, a special agent and a revenue agent"2
asked the taxpayer's consent to view his records. The agents stated
that they "were going to make an investigation . . . ."' The tax-
payer consented upon hearing this statement. Although the agents
displayed their credentials, they did not state whether the audit was
intended for criminal prosecution or simply for civil collection. Be-
cause a special agent was involved and neither the special agent's
function nor the purpose of the investigation was explained, the
taxpayer argued that he was deceived into giving up his records
because he inferred from the agents' assertions that they intended
only a civil audit.' Although the knowledge of a criminal audit
would be material to a decision of consent in this matter, the court
nevertheless determined that the misrepresentation was of such a
passive nature that it did not meet the affirmativeness standard. 5
In effect, the misrepresentation was so indirect that it could not
have led the taxpayer to believe the investigation was civil in na-
ture. Hence, the consent was not vitiated.
The purpose behind the affirmativeness standard, layered on
top of the materiality requirement, seems to be to establish a de
minimis rule. Because elemental assertions may be material, the
courts, without such a standard, would be flooded with insignificant
yet troublesome claims of misrepresentation.
The standard of affirmativeness is not, by definition, limited to
intentional misrepresentations. Intentional assertions naturally
carry with them, in most cases, a greater degree of affirmativeness,
yet, negligent misrepresentations could possibly achieve the re-
quired state of affirmativeness given the specific circumstances. An
unintentional communication may be more assertive than a compa-
rable intentional statement in that the extemporaneous nature of a
92. The distinction between the functions of the IRS agents is important. The revenue
agent is to conduct civil audits only, i.e., tax investigations with the intended purpose of
determining civil liability. As the investigation changes in mode from civil to criminal (i.e.,
when evidence of criminal violations emerges), the case is transferred to the Criminal Investi-
gation Division (formerly the Intelligence Division) where a Special Agent of that Division is
assigned to the case. See also Bray, Production of Documents and Seizure of Evidence, 32
N.Y.U. INSTIT. ON FED. TAX 1223 (1974).
93. 468 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1973).
94. Id. at 100. The INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL presently requires all special agents to give
warnings, on first contact with the investigatee, as to his function and the possibility of
criminal liability. MT 9900 (1-29-75), § 242.132, cited in Harris & Warner, Fifth Circuit
Reaffirms Distaste for IRS Misrepresentation, 56 TAXES 28, 31-33 (1978). For dicta strongly
confirming the consent rule, see United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976);
People v. Quinlon, 245 Cal. App. 2d 624, 54 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297-98 (1966).
95. 468 F.2d 93, 100, 104-05 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1973).
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negligent communication may cloak it in a higher degree of credibil-
ity to the listener.
H. Misrepresentation Cases
The decisions described in this section, although not necessar-
ily the leading cases in the field, develop a more direct focus on the
issue of governmental misrepresentation in consent searches than
do those cases usually relied on by most courts. In each situation,
the validity of the search or seizure is not dependent upon the exist-
ence of a search warrant, although one may have been procured.
Intentional and direct verbal misrepresentation constitutes the
most easily recognizable type of deception and therefore is well
developed from a decisional standpoint. In Commonwealth v.
Wright, 11 police detectives sought to recover stolen money. They had
a suspect under arrest, but could not persuade him to confess to the
crime or state where the money was hidden. Frustrated by this, the
detectives, to retrieve the funds without waiting for the suspect to
change his mind, went to the suspect's apartment where they found
his wife waiting in the hallway. Sensing that she was aware of the
suspect's plight, the detectives announced the totally false report
that her husband had confessed all and that he had stated that he
wanted her to hand over the "stuff" to the detectives. 7 In the face
of those statements, she complied and told them where the money
was located. The trial court ordered the suppression of the evi-
dence.8
On appeal by the State, the defendant claimed the money was
illegally seized because the officers had gained the consent of the
wife by using fraud and deception. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania agreed with the defendant and affirmed, citing Gouled. 1 Be-
cause the detectives had neither a search warrant nor probable
cause to believe the money was at the suspect's apartment, their
seizure of it was totally dependent upon the validity of the wife's
consent. Two years prior to the case, the Supreme Court of the
United States ordered. state courts to enforce an exclusionary rule
for illegally obtained evidence."°° Therefore, the court in Wright held
the money inadmissible and affirmed the trial court's order.'0'
96. 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963).
97. Id. at 82, 190 A.2d at 710.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 83, 190 A.2d at 711; see note 44 supra.
100. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. 411 Pa. 83, 190 A.2d 709 (1963).
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Wright serves as an important model for the analysis of materi-
ality and affirmativeness in consent searches. Had the detectives
stated only that the suspect had "confessed," the misrepresentation
would most likely not have been considered material to her handing
over the money. The logical link between such deception and the
wife's consent to the seizure would at best be tenuous; it does not
necessarily follow that she would have disclosed the location of the
money simply upon a representation that her husband had con-
fessed. The detectives, however, need not have been so brief. They
could probably have avoided running afoul of the affirmativeness
test by rephrasing their statements only slightly. Instead of stating,
in effect, "He has confessed and wants you to give us the stuff," they
could have said, "We have got him. He has talked. Now why don't
you hand over the stuff?" Some courts might consider this assertion
rather affirmative in its deception also,'10 but it comes considerably
closer to being mere innuendo than the statements which the detec-
tives actually made.
A slightly less overt variation of the intentional and direct ver-
bal type of deception arose in one of the long line of moonshine
cases. In United States v. Reckis,'03 alcohol tax agents arrived at a
suspect's farm and told one of the defendants, "The boss sent me
down to fix the still."'1' Believing this statement, a defendant gave
the agent a key which, in turn, allowed him to discover the illegal
distillery. The agent's misrepresentation was material because it
could have reasonably induced the consent. Further, it was affirma-
tive because it required few, if any, additional assumptions on the
part of the consentor. Therefore, the court deemed the consent vi-
tiated by the misrepresentation. 5
102. Cf. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (see notes 123-33 and
accompanying text infra).
103. 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954). The federal agent kept the premises under
surveillance prior to his entry, and even smelled the distinctive aroma of sour mash emanat-
ing therefrom. The agent, sensing he did not have quite enough probable cause for a warrant,
failed to obtain one.
104. Id. at 689.
105. Id. at 690-91. The defendant lessor, however, failed in his suppression motion be-
cause of his lack of standing. In order to exert one's fourth amendment rights in any given
controversy, the claimant must show that his rights, and not those of a third party, were
violated by an official search and seizure. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
To have standing, one must prove that he has a possessory interest in or was legitimately
present at the location searched, has a reasonable expectation of privacy therein, or a posses-
sory interest in the articles seized. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). If the article
seized was illegally possessed, the possession of which the defendant is being charged, the
defendant will have "automatic" standing to object to any search or seizure of those items.
Id. at 261-62. To accommodate the claimant's challenge to such a search or seizure, the Court
has held that any evidence presented by the defendant to establish possession for the purpose
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Intentional but indirect verbal misrepresentation is more diffi-
cult to detect. It arises where the statement is facially correct, but
fails to state the actual or whole purpose behind the search and
seizure.101 Although the case dealt with entry for arrest, People v.
Superior Court' is relevant to this issue. Local police sought to
of the suppression motion may not be used against him on the merits of the criminal charge.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390-91 (1968). See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968).
106. See text accompanying notes 127.30 infra for an instance where failure to speak was
considered a misrepresentation.
107. 73 Cal. App. 3d 65, 139 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Ct. App. 1977). The question whether
deception may be used to gain entry to make an arrest, with or without a warrant for the
arrest, stands on different footing than the question in standard consent searches. From a
conceptual viewpoint, it probably ought not, because the government's entry into private
premises to make an arrest of the owner is as much a search and seizure as the taking of
inanimate evidence. Nevertheless, arrest entry presents a completely distinct set of rules from
those of fourth amendment consent. The complicating factor in the analysis of entry for arrest
is that the common law presented such entry as an exception to the probable cause and
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. See Barnard v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.)
501, 502 (1852). At common law, an officer serving criminal process, e.g., an arrest warrant,
could break into private premises to search for and arrest the owner as long as the officer
announced his purpose before he entered. Id. Probable cause as to the arrestee's whereabouts
was not necessary to validate the search and eventual seizure (arrest) unless the premises to
be searched belonged to a third party. The rules for execution of search warrants were basi-
cally the same. If a breaking were necessary, the officer executing the warrant had to an-
nounce his purpose first, and then enter. Of course, by the fact of its existence, the search
warrant presumes probable cause to believe the person or object to be seized is located in
the place to be searched. The arrest warrant, however, presumes only probable cause to
believe that the person sought committed the alleged crime. Therefore, entry of premises to
arrest the owner was a significant exception to the rule that probable cause is necessary for
the government to search private property.
The common law rule for executing search warrants was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1975). The Supreme Court in Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), held that § 3109,
which requires an announcement of purpose before a "breaking" into premises, would also
control the execution of arrest warrants and exigent arrests. The Court then made exceptions
to this statutory rule by holding in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), that no announce-
ment is necessary where it is reasonably believed that evidence is being destroyed or that life
and limb are in jeopardy. Id. at 37-43. Because the arrest rule was an exception to the
requirements of the fourth amendment as to warrants to search, federal courts looked no
further than § 3109 in assessing the validity of a given entry for arrest. The statute said
nothing of entry by deception and more importantly, there was little authority to the effect
that entry by ruse was not a "breaking" for the purposes of § 3109 and its state counterparts.
Thus, the deception issue in making arrests within private premises totally circumvented the
consent rules under the fourth amendment. See generally Note, 8 Hous. L. REV. 977 (1971).
Lower federal courts tended to allow deception. See United States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977 (5th
Cir. 1971); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948
(1965). Although the Supreme Court extended the meaning of the word "breaking" to include
the simple opening of an unlocked door, Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968), it
specifically reserved the deceptive entry question. Id. at 590 n.7. The Courts of Appeal for
the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits have applied more stringent requirements for
entry to arrest, especially for entries made during the night. In Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court established the guidelines for making searches of
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arrest a defendant who they thought to be within a certain dwelling.
They had neither an arrest nor a search warrant, nor probable cause
to believe that he was in the house. When the defendant's brother
answered the door, the police, in order to gain entrance by the
consent of the brother, stated that they merely wanted "to talk to"
the defendant.0 8 They were allowed into the dwelling on the basis
of those representations, and once inside, immediately proceeded to
arrest the defendant.
This consent to enter can be analyzed from two points of view.
The court recognized that in one respect, the police action exceeded
the scope implied by the brother's consent under the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding it.'°" The brother could have been inferred
to say, "You may enter only to talk." In a different respect, however,
the brother was induced by the misrepresentation as to the purpose
of the entry. The officers did not directly state an untruth. They had
every intention of doing some talking while inside the dwelling.
They also intended to arrest the defendant, however. The purpose
of the search was very material to any consent given for it, and the
deception was affirmative as to effect. Thus, the statement which
constituted legal misrepresentation was material and relevant, and
the court correctly decided that it rendered the police action in-
valid."0
Direct, nonverbal assertions may also constitute vitiating mis-
representation. Assertive conduct can communicate false, mislead-
ing or inaccurate information and if that information is material
and affirmative to a consent decision, the consent is vitiated. The
analysis is objective; inferences are tested by the triers of fact as if
they had observed the transaction.
A juvenile case, In re Robert T., is illustrative of misrepresen-
tation through assertive conduct. In that case, a police investigator
in plain clothes sought to inspect the apartment of a party he sus-
private premises, listing several factors needed to conclude that there is "strong reason" to
believe the person to be arrested is within the premises. In United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d
1131 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit categorically rejected the idea that guise entries are
valid to make an arrest. Id. at 1134. Much like the state counterpart in the case in the text,
the court in Phillips virtually placed the guise entries for arrest on the same consent standard
as warrantless searches under the fourth amendment. Id. at 1135. Nevertheless, the exception
to the warrant requirement for entries to arrest is firmly grounded in the case law of the other
circuits. See generally Comment, Validity of Ruse Entry to Execute A Search or Arrest, 42
ALB. L. REV. 453, 465 n.93 (1978).
108. 73 Cal. App. 3d 65, 68, 139 Cal. Rptr. 343, 344.
109. Id. at 69, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46; see text accompanying note 144 infra, for a brief
discussion on the "scope" theory of deception in consent.
110. Id.
111. 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1970).
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pected of concealing stolen goods. Proceeding without a warrant, the
officer enlisted the assistance of the owner of the building. The
owner knocked on the respective door and a child answered. The
owner asked to be let inside and introduced the officer as "[mly
friend Joe.""' The two were let inside where the goods were discov-
ered; the officer seized the goods and made arrests.
The owner's introduction could have constituted material and
affirmative governmental misrepresentation in that the activities
could be imputed to the officer through concepts of agency."' The
court held, however, that it was the officer's acquiescence in the
deceit which in itself constituted material and affirmative decep-
tion."'4 Because the officer was in plain clothes, and the owner intro-
duced him as a friend, the officer's silence communicated an affirm-
ance of the introduction which would mislead the consentor. Silence
in this case did speak louder than words: "I am Joe, a friend of the
owner who merely wants to look at the apartment for reasons other
than police investigation." In the case, the court cursorily merged
the verbal and nonverbal misrepresentations into one unified trans-
action and relied upon Gouled in holding that the misrepresentation
vitiated the consent."1
5
Cases demonstrating negligent verbal misrepresentation are
rare, mainly because remarks made by police during investigations
are typically quite intentional. In People v. Porter,I' s however, the
misrepresentation involved was actually more negligent than inten-
tional. Plainclothes officers knocked on an apartment door in a
routine investigation. They had neither a search warrant nor proba-
ble cause to enter the apartment. When they knocked, a voice from
within asked, "Is that you, Bill?""' 7 Since the officer's nickname
coincidently was "Bill,""' he replied, "Yes.""' 9 The occupant un-
locked the door and the officers stepped in. After the officers en-
tered, they seized contraband and arrested the occupant.' 0
The court considered the officer's answer as deception in that
he could have reasonably assumed that another "Bill" was being
addressed."' Therefore, the court held the answer to be a wrongful
112. Id. at 993-94, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
113. See notes 73-80 and accompanying text supra.
114. 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 994-95, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (Ct. App. 1970).
115. Id.
116. 227 Cal. App. 2d 211, 38 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Ct. App. 1964).
117. Id. at 212, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
118. Id. at 215 n.1, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 623 n.1.
119. Id. at 212, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 215 n.1, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 623 n.1.
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deception which induced the opening of the door. 122
A recent case reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, United States v. Tweel, 121 stands at the outer limits of con-
sent analysis. Although the court coalesced into this opinion the
sum and substance of the traditional rules restricting governmental
misrepresentation, the factual circumstances of the case extend the
doctrine of affirmativeness to an extraordinary holding. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service had sought Nicholas Tweel's tax records for
audit purposes. In a telephone conversation with Tweel's account-
ant, the IRS revenue agent requested production of Twell's tax
records. In prior years Tweel had been audited, but no criminal
charges had been filed against him. Realizing the high probability
that the audit had been instituted for the purpose of criminal prose-
cution, the accountant asked whether a special agent was involved
in the matter. He undoubtedly knew that criminal investigations by
the IRS were carried on by special agents, while revenue agents were
limited to civil audits."' In response to the question, the IRS agent
stated truthfully that no special agent was involved with the case.
He did not, however, state that the audit had been instituted at the
behest of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Department of Justice.' Relying on the answer given by the agent,
the accountant turned over Tweel's records to the IRS. Criminal
charges of tax evasion were brought based upon the information
gained from the records. Tweel was ultimately convicted of tax eva-
sion and making false statements.
6
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case'2 on the ground that the
IRS agent affirmatively misrepresented the purpose of the investi-
gation in order to convince the accountant to hand over the records.
Although the misrepresentation amounted to nothing more than the
failure to supplement the response with information not specifically
demanded, the court viewed the agent's activity as "sneaky, delib-
erate deception."'2 8 To support that finding, the court held that in
these circumstances, the government agent had-a duty to give com-
plete information to the accountant. The silence, in itself, prompted
122. Id. at 214-15, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24.
123. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
124. See notes 92 & 94 supra.
125. 550 F.2d 297, 298 (5th Cir. 1977). OCRS, which investigates only criminal matters,
requested this audit in its own name. Id. at 298 n.4.
126. Id. at 298.
127. Id. at 300. The court remanded to determine which evidence was tainted by the
illegal acts.
128. Id. at 299.
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a misconception of the truth.'
The operative statements in Tweel transpired in a telephone
conversation. Therefore, no nonverbal communications by the agent
could have contributed to any of his assertions. Moreover, the de-
ception did not lie in what was said; the deception lay totally in that
which was not said. To this extent, Tweel breaks new ground in
finding affirmativeness in nonassertive silence. The decision is even
more interesting in that the review of the factual circumstances at
the appellate level altered the basic findings of the trial court. In
drawing these fine lines between deception and no deception, the
Fifth Circuit necessarily reweighed the evidence. Nevertheless, the
traditional rules of consent were vindicated in close accordance with
the dicta in Gouled. 13
0
The result in Tweel, although based on the well-established
consent rule, reflects an important factor in the development of the
undercover prerogative. 13' In undercover cases, arguments made by
defendants on appeal have greatly understated the importance and
function of the consent rule. In those cases, discussion of the consent
rule amounted to little more than a brief citation to Gouled. The
Supreme Court paid little or no attention to whether deception
altered the validity of consent.' 32 The Fifth Circuit in Tweel, how-
ever, heard a highly developed discussion reviewing the consent rule
in depth. 13 In sum, the strength of the fourth amendment consent
rules may have suffered more in the arguments of inept counsel than
at the hands of insensitive courts.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNDERCOVER PREROGATIVE
A. Through On Lee
In all of their simplicity, the consent rules restricting govern-
mental misrepresentation stood, until recently, as a considerable
impediment to the use of undercover agents. The rules of entrap-
ment would allow almost unbridled deception for coaxing the pro-
spective defendant to commit crimes. 3 On the other hand, even
mild deception on the part of officials in gaining consent to enter
129. Id. at 299-300.
130. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The Tweel court stated its holding in
part: "Since the consent given by appellant was obtained by deception, the microfilming of
the documents constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment."
550 F.2d at 300. See Harris & Warner, supra note 94, and cases cited therein.
131. For a discussion of the development of the undercover prerogative, see part IV infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 165-66 infra.
133. See Brief for Appellant at 7-15, United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
134. For a discussion of entrapment rules, see notes 65-72 and accompanying text supra.
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private premises could render the subsequent search illegal. Al-
though the "standing" rules'35 were of some help to law enforcement
officials in this regard, they fretted under this clear double standard
and sought to have the consent rules equated with those of entrap-
ment, notwithstanding established fourth amendment principles.
The unyielding power of the consent rule was demonstrated to
law enforcement officials in 1932 in Fraternal Order of Eagles, No.
778 v. United States. 31 Prohibition was in full swing and state offi-
cials were very reluctant to enforce the Volstead Act3 7 and its state
counterparts. Therefore, the full weight of enforcing those laws fell
upon federal officials. In an attempt to halt flagrant violations of the
laws by a fraternal organization in Pennsylvania, federal agents
visited the lodge premises dressed in plain clothes and pretended to
be members in good standing of an out-of-state chapter of the same
organization. In reliance on these false assertions by the agents, the
proprietors allowed the agents to enter and partake of the alcoholic
beverages being served inside. The agents later used the information
gained from this initial entry as support for a search warrant. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reliance on Gouled, held
the evidence illegally obtained through the ruse, and therefore inad-
missible, 35 thus underscoring the control of the consent rule over use
of undercover agents.
Judge Buffington's dissent in the case, however, rejected the
consent rationale under these circumstances. 3 He stressed that the
consent rule had an unjustified'crippling effect upon law enforce-
ment, and especially undercover investigations. Because it articu-
lated the tension between the consent rule and undercover investi-
gations, this dissent presaged the judicial conflict that took almost
forty years to resolve. From the end of Prohibition until the
"undercover" cases, the strength of the Gouled dicta remained in-
tact, with minor exceptions in lower court decisions which either
were totally oblivious to the consent rule' 0 or treated the issue in
dicta. "' The Supreme Court of the United States would not accept
135. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
136. 57 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1932).
137. 27 U.S.C. § 34 (1976).
138. 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3rd Cir. 1932).
139. Id. at 95.
140. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963).
141. Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1954); see United States
v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961). Although the Sixth
Circuit in Bush recited the basic Gouled dicta, it seemed greatly influenced by the idea
suggested in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952), that misrepresentation of
identity alone was not affirmative enough to negate consent. The record in Bush reveals that
[Vol. 34:57
GOVERNMENTAL DECEPTION
certiorari in the matter until 1951, when electronic eavesdropping
began to emerge. In On Lee v. United States'42 the Court faced a
factual situation in which governmental misrepresentation had
been used as a medium for effectuating electronic surveillance. Al-
though the opinion centered on the "bugging" issue, it also paid
passing notice to the cqnsent rules.
The transactions in On Lee were a paradigm of undercover
technique. Chin Poy, an old acquaintance of the defendant, had
been enlisted by government agents to help investigate alleged nar-
cotics transactions of the defendant. The agents affixed a micro-
phone to Chin Poy's body in conjunction with a device that could
transmit the audio signals to a receiver located a short distance
away. Upon instructions, Chin Poy visited the defendant's laundry,
stood in "public access" areas and struck up a conversation with the
defendant."3 Through the receiving apparatus, a federal agent out-
side the laundry heard the defendant make incriminating state-
ments in this conversation. On a later occasion, the identical system
was used to gain the same sort of admissions in a conversation
taking place on a city sidewalk. At trial, Chin Poy did not testify,"'
but the federal agent who had listened to the conversations through
the recording device did testify. He was the sole source for the in-
criminating statements. The defendant was convicted,'45 based pri-
marily upon the admissions.
The Court addressed the issue of deception in gaining the con-
sent of the defendant as a subsidiary point to the questions sur-
rounding the electronic eavesdropping.'" The opinion suggested the
possible application of the misrepresentation restrictions by observ-
ing that Chin Poy had committed no overt deception to meet the
affirmativeness standard." ' Therefore, the misrepresentation would
the federal agent probably did make affirmative misrepresentations under the standards of
affirmativeness discussed in the text accompanying notes 89-95 supra. The wired agent in On
Lee had not misrepresented his identity.
142. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
143. Id. at 749.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 748.
146. Although some form of electronic eavesdropping is an integral part of most under-
cover activities, the fourth amendment considerations are totally different than those dis-
cussed here concerning consent by deception. The introduction of listening devices implicates
either the idea of exceeding the scope of consent (by the introduction of a "third ear") or the
fact that no consent whatsoever was gained for the introduction. Thus, it ends up at the
narrow holding of GouLed: there is no warrant or consent. Except in the unlikely case where
the defendant is deceived as to the actual function of a listening device, no deception is
involved.
147. 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952).
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not negate the original consent. Although On Lee upheld what Jus-
tice Frankfurter labeled a "dirty business,""'4 Justice Jackson's ma-
jority opinion at least recognized the consent rule. Precisely what
Chin Poy said in each conversation is unclear from the opinions and
briefs, but because there was no identity deception and his state-
ments seemed to be couched in vague generalities, Chin Poy may
not have affirmatively deceived the defendant under the traditional
definition of affirmativeness. These issues, however, were mere sur-
plusage because the Court held that Chin Poy did not at any time
enter areas of the defendant's premises that were not openly accessi-
ble to the public. Although statements may have been made in an
expectation of privacy, there actually was no search or seizure which
implicated the fourth amendment under the then prevailing propri-
etory test.'49
B. Lopez
On Lee may have satisfied law enforcement officials in expand-
ing their use of electronic bugging devises carried on the person, but
it did not speak to the issue of undercover investigations in a man-
ner contrary to the Gouled dicta. 150 Twelve years later, in Lopez v.
United States,'5' an IRS agent pretended to "play along" with an
unsolicited bribe offer from the defendant. The agent carried a
small recording device which stored incriminating statements made
in the defendant's private office during meetings with the agent.
Again, the electronic eavesdropping issue dominated the discussion.
Unlike On Lee, however, the Court in Lopez failed to address the
consent rule in any forthright manner. Justice Harlan's majority
opinion cursorily dismissed the claim of misrepresentation in the
following manner:
We need not be long detained by the belated claim that [the
agent] should not have been permitted to testify about the
148. Id. at 758.
149. The Court stated:
Petitioner relies on cases relating to the more common and clearly distin-
guishable problems raised where tangible property is unlawfully seized. Such
unlawful seizure may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself
was by subterfuge or fraud rather than force. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (the authority of the latter case is
sharply limited by Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, at 463). But such
decisions are inapposite in the field of mechanical or electronic devices designed
to overhear or intercept conversation, at least where access to the listening post
was not obtained by illegal methods.
Id. at 753.
150. Id. at 751-52.
151. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
[Vol. 34:57
GO VERNMENTAL DECEPTION
[incriminating] conversation .... [The agent] was not guilty
of an unlawful invasion of [the defendant's] office simply be-
cause his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was not real. He
was in the office with [the defendant's] consent, and while there
he did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing something
surreptitiously without [the defendant's] knowledge. Compare
Gouled v. United States, supra. The only evidence obtained con-
sisted of statements made by [the defendant] to [the agent],
statements which [the defendant] knew full well could be used
against him by [the agent] if he wished. We decline to hold that
whenever an offer of a bribe is made in private, and the offeree
does not intend to accept, that offer is a constitutionally pro-
tected communication.'52
The Court could have reached the same result in this case as it
did in On Lee by interpreting the statements by the agent as not
constituting an affirmative misrepresentation. That conclusion
would probably have been supported by the facts because the
agent's statements to the defendant indicated complicity almost
totally by innuendo. 5 3 Moreover, his true identity was known to the
defendant. As the quoted discussion reflects, however, the Court in
Lopez seemed to imply that no misrepresentations had been made.
Thus, this decision affirming the trial court's finding that there was
no deception under these facts, added little understanding to the
Court's position on misrepresentation in consent searches.' The im-
portance of Lopez lies in the Court's clear rejection of the import-
ance of the Gouled dicta. By limiting Gouled to its narrow hold-
ing,"' the Court in effect said that at least in these situations, sur-
reptitious procurement of consent is not prohibited. 5
C. Lewis
In 1966, the Court considered the issue of consent by deception
in a factual situation not encumbered by the questions surrounding
electronic eavesdropping. Since Lopez, three years earlier, a Presi-
dent had been assassinated and Chief Justice Warren, presiding
over a commission named after him, had called for a greater empha-
sis on the use of police intelligence operations to combat burgeoning
152. Id. at 438.
153. Id. at 429-32, 435-36.
154. Searches without a warrant, probable cause or consent are unconstitutional.
155. The Court had earlier recognized but limited the consent dicta in Gouled to tangible
evidence in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928), rev'd on other grounds,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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urban violence.' 6 In addition, the drug culture had expanded its
reach into virgin suburbia and the war in Vietnam had produced
what then seemed to be considerable security problems. It was in
this setting that Lewis v. United States'57 eliminated any applica-
tion of the consent rule to undercover investigations by government
officials.
Federal officials had been investigating marijuana distribution
in the Greater Boston area. A narcotics officer learned the defen-
dant's name through a third party and contacted the defendant by
telephone. In that conversation, the officer identified himself falsely
as "Jimmy the Pollack" and arranged a sale of marijuana at the
defendant's home. When the officer knocked at the defendant's door
to consummate the sale, the defendant, "Duke" Lewis, opened the
door partially and asked the officer to identify himself. The answer
was, "I'm Jim."'"" Lewis then asked whether the agent was known
by any nickname and the agent answered "the Pollack."'' 5 Lewis
invited the agent into his home and completed the sale.' °
Although the record clearly showed that the government could
have obtained a search warrant at any point in the investigation,''
none was procured. Upon a subsequent deal made under the same
circumstances, the defendant was arrested. Evidence gathered at
both transactions was introduced by the prosecution. The defense
claimed that the agent's misrepresentations vitiated any consent
given by Lewis, thus rendering the searches and seizures illegal."0 2
The court nonetheless held the searches legal and Lewis was con-
victed of illegal transfers of marijuana.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Gouled
and affirmed the decision of the trial court."6 3 Their short opinion
drew a distinction between those "invitations" by the consentor
which are for "proper purposes" as in Gouled and those that are not,
as in Lewis. '
In disposing of the claims of misrepresentation and vitiated
consent in Lewis, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice War-
ren, again distinguished Gouled'5 as it had done in Lopez and would
156. THE WARREN REPORT, supra note 5, at 186.
157. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
158. Id. at 207.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 208 n.4.
162. Id. at 208.
163. 352 F.2d 799 (lst Cir. 1965).
164. Id. at 799; see note 200 and accompanying text infra.
165. 385 U.S. 206, 209-11 (1966).
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do again in Hoffa, and hence extinguished any persuasive effect of
the Gouled dicta. A closer reading of Lopez by Lewis' counsel might
have demonstrated the uselessness of citing Gouled for the claims.
Instead, a wealth of lower court decisions demonstrating the decep-
tion restrictions could have been cited to make the Court's job in
Lewis considerably more delicate, if not difficult. 6 '
The central holding in Lewis actually transcended any discus-
sion of consent or misrepresentation. The Court came to the abrupt
conclusion that by turning his home into a virtual "commercial
center"'6 7 for narcotics, "Duke" Lewis had forfeited any fourth
amendment protection. According to the Court, the defendant, by
commercializing his domicile, established an implied consent to the
entry of all comers to his home. Therefore, according to the Lewis
holding, the actions of the narcotics agent transpired totally outside
the scope of fourth amendment protection.
Viewing the case in this manner, the Court insulated its deci-
sion in the cloak of factual finding: Lewis' house was not a home; it
was in effect a drug merchandising firm open to the public. This
imaginative finding ended the fourth amendment issue in the case
and seemed to provide a convenient method for supporting under-
cover searches in the future.
Although only dicta, the Court's distinction of Gouled is en-
lightening. The Court found the agent's activities in Lewis different
from the activities in the Gouled case because the agent in Lewis
seized the very object contemplated by the defendant in the trans-
action.6 8 The Court seemed to say that the eventual seizure did not
exceed the scope of the consent given in that Lewis had intended to
give the marijuana to the agent. Gouled, on the other hand, had not
intended to surrender the papers. If the misrepresentation problem
were simply a matter of exceeding the scope of consent, this ap-
proach would have woven the undercover exception into the consent
rules with precision. The "scope" approach, however, presumes that
the initial consent was valid, which under the deception restrictions
was not the case. The agent made material and affirmative misre-
166. See cases cited in notes 41 & 46 supra.
167. "[W]hen, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to which out-
siders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to
no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street." 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966). See Note, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 115,
125, 186, 192 (1967). See generally Comment, The Applicability of the "New Fourth Amend-
ment" to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of The Emerging Fourth
Amendment Right To Privacy, 45 WASH. L. REV. 785 (1970) (author suggests imaginative
distinction between quantity and quality of privacy in fourth amendment protection).
168. 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966).
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presentations in order to gain consent to enter the defendant's
home. The deal was consummated in the house. All of the evidence
admitted at trial was either directly or indirectly derived from the
original consent and was therefore tainted by the illegality., 9 The
fact that the agent did not exceed the scope of the negated consent
was irrelevant.
Beyond its brevity and questionable finding that the defendant
no longer lived in a house, Lewis indicated an important perspective
on the issue of governmental misrepresentation. The Court clearly
was struggling for a way to allow undercover investigators to enter
private premises, and yet restrict such incursions to factual situa-
tions much like those in Lopez and Lewis. A dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Warren in Hoffa v. United States'70 suggested that the
Court had not sought to eliminate the restrictions on governmental
subterfuge, notwithstanding its rejection of the Gouled dicta."' In
any event, the Lewis opinion and dissents substantiated in a cryptic
manner the conceptual tension between the need for effective un-
dercover agents and the rules of consent and firmly established the
undercover prerogative.
D. White
With the emergence of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard in Katz v. United States, '" the holdings in On Lee, Lopez
and Lewis appeared to be substantially altered, if not overruled.
Lewis seemed most vulnerable to the supposed expansion of the
fourth amendment right announced in Katz, because of the clear
and reasonable intent of "Duke" Lewis to establish a private envi-
ronment for his marijuana sale. This issue was resolved in 1971 in
169. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra, concerning the "derivative evidence
rule."
170. 385 U.S. 293, 313 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
171. The Chief Justice was mainly upset with the majority's failure to overturn the
finding of the trial court that Partin was not a government agent. Id. at 313-14. In addition,
he saw the facts in Hoffa as distinguishable from the other undercover cases, especially Lewis,
in that the evidence taken in Hoffa was "unrelated to the business purpose of [Partin's] visit.
As we said in affirming Lewis' conviction, the principles elaborated in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), would protect against such overreaching." Id. at 316. As the
discussion of the lower court cases indicate (see text accompanying notes 182-86 infra), the
Chief Justice may have meant to state this view of Gouled, but his majority opinion in Lewis
failed to articulate it clearly. Again, he stated in his Hoffa dissenting opinion, "An invasion
of basic rights made possible by prevailing upon friendship with the victim is no less pro-
scribed than an invasion accomplished by force." Id. at 314. It is evident that the Chief
Justice wanted something of Gouled to remain after the undercover cases.
172. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
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White v. United States. ' In retrospect, the Court's purpose in
White was to pronounce that Katz had not modified the undercover
cases.
Although the issue of electronic surveillance cropped up again
in White, the undercover activities were quite analogous to those in
Lewis. The federal agents, assuming false identities, procured infor-
mation through the defendant's consent to entry into his private
premises. Several conversations, which included the defendant's
incriminating statements, took place during a secret meeting in the
defendant's home. For consent purposes, the facts were identical to
Lewis.
Justice White's opinion addressed the claim of governmental
misrepresentation by holding that there was no justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy on the part of the defendant. "4 The Court recognized
that it is well known throughout society that the government uses
undercover agents and that it is reasonable to assume that one's
colleagues in an illegal activity may be federal officers incognito.
7 5
One may expect and even demand privacy in distributing mari-
juana or participating in other crimes, but such expectation will not
be considered reasonable. Misplaced trust in government officials
was the damning factor. Thus, the narrow holding of White removed
the whole investigative transaction from the scope of the fourth
amendment and foreclosed any need to discuss consent or misrepre-
sentation. From this perspective, the Katz standard made the rejec-
tion of fourth amendment coverage in White fit the facts more sensi-
bly than the same result in Lewis which was decided under the old
proprietorial standard. 7 A house may not be a home, but, as the
word is used in the fourth amendment, it still is a house, and the
expectation of privacy in this house is only as reasonable or justified
as the Court sees fit.
173. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
174. Id. at 751-53.
175. Id. Justice White's opinion, in which only the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart and
Justice Blackmun joined, developed with more emphasis the assumption of risk idea stated
in Hof(a, and repeated in Katz: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 .... " 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Whether this conceptualization
comported with the facts of these cases is irrelevant. White's opinion stated simply that these
situations will not constitute a justifiable expectation of privacy. Although it is clear that one
may assume the risk of many nongovernmental detriments, such as a roommate's consent to
search of a jointly-used duffel bag, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), nowhere else but in
the undercover prerogative does one assume the risk that the government is abridging its
limitations.
176. See text accompanying notes 151-76 supra.
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From On Lee through White, the Court was dealing with under-
cover agents, all of whom achieved their purposes by pretending to
be participants or potential participants in the crime involved.
While this characteristic attaches to most undercover ploys in the
drug world and organized crime, it does not fill the field of possible
undercover techniques. In contrast to participational guises, govern-
ment agents could assume nonparticipational roles in maintaining
internal surveillance of suspected criminal activity. This distinction
is important in order to extract the narrowest holdings of the under-
cover cases. The emphasis in White upon reasonability of the expec-
tation of privacy among colleagues involved in an illegal act, and
the supporting arguments in Lewis focusing on an invitation into
the house for the very object contemplated, indicate that the under-
cover prerogative ought not extend to those forms of surveillance
which are implimented by agents not intending to become involved
in the criminal activity. While this distinction may be deducible
from the opinions, it is by no means explicit.
E. Analysis
The immediate question raised by the undercover cases is, in
what way did the cases alter the rules restricting governmental mis-
representation in consent searches? Clearly, garden variety under-
cover investigations no longer fall under the protection of the fourth
amendment, but questions remain about the status of the rules
reflected in the Gouled dicta and the definition of "undercover in-
vestigation." If "misplaced trust" in one's associates removes the
surrounding transactions from the scope of the amendment, then
virtually any consent gained by deception might be upheld.
The issue is not purely academic. A major abrogation of the
restrictions on governmental deception would undermine the war-
rant requirement and in many cases obviate the effect of the fourth
amendment. If the government is authorized to enter private prem-
ises through the use of any ruse, much has been gained for law
enforcement. Similarly, owing to the general openness with which
Americans manage their private premises, the government could
maintain almost constant interior surveillance of private areas pre-
viously protected under the amendment. A greater compromise of
the fourth amendment could hardly be envisioned. The mechanics
of the system are not difficult to imagine. The economy of this
country is heavily geared to the consumption of durable goods and
personal services on private premises. With that consumption
comes an endless procession of service and delivery personnel. Al-
though the typical American freeholder or lessee does not make
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prior acquaintance with most commercial people visiting his prem-
ises, there is a typical element of unearned trust reposed in them.
This trust is prompted, in major part, by the economic interest of
providing goods or services in the most expedient manner possible.
To this end, commercial underpinnings engender the very trust
which could easily be used by the government to maintain surveil-
lance over a given private area. Added to these opportunities of
entry are the social calls made every day to individuals in their
private premises by persons previously unknown to them. With very
little imagination, but some planning and control, government au-
thorities could employ a host of nonparticipational schemes to gain
entry on a repeated basis to practically any private area. Having
established a legally permissible vantage point, it would seem sense-
less for the officials to worry about procuring a neutral magistrate's
authorization for a search. A building inspector's or meter man's
uniform would be far more convenient than obtaining a search war-
rant. Besides, search warrants require probable cause; undercover
ruses, as in White, do not. Thus, the warrant requirement would be
resorted to only for searches and seizures in which undercover work
would be physically or economically unfeasible.
The argument countervailing these fears is that the undercover
prerogative could not or would not be extended to nonparticipa-
tional deceptions. In the first place, the undercover cases concerned
only participational guises and were limited strictly to the facts of
each case.'77 Therefore, those holdings cannot be used for direct
support for nonparticipational deception. In addition, the "very
purpose contemplated" rationale in Lewis and the "colleague" im-
plication in White'7' indicate the Court had no intention of extend-
ing the undercover prerogative beyond the scope of participational
misrepresentation. The object was to allow the police to imperson-
ate drug purchasers and coconspirators, not to impersonate furnace
repairmen or travelling salesmen.'79
This argument is taken completely from the negative, as it
must be, because the undercover cases set new powers, not limita-
tions. Contrary to most authority, the cases establish a legal ability
on the part of government to use material and affirmative misrepre-
177. "[I]n this area, each case must be judged on its own particular facts." Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966).
178. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). The Court also used the expres-
sions "companions," "associates" and "trusted accomplices." Id.'
179. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Hoffa makes this point unquestionably
clear. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 317-21 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). It is, of course,
of only persuasional value in arguing any case under these facts.
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sentation for gaining consent to enter private property. Further-
more, it is reasonable to assume that law enforcement officials will
be inclined, if not duty bound, to use whatever legal means are
available to enforce the law.8 0 This itself may be an understate-
ment. The "very purpose contemplated" dicta in Lewis is not a
strong limitation on the use of the undercover prerogative. The cen-
tral rationale of the undercover cases, that misplaced confidence in
one's colleagues does not trigger fourth amendment protection, im-
poses no limitation on the government, so long as its actions are
"reasonable."'' If Lewis and White had concerned very unique fac-
tual patterns, one could legitimately aver that the cases turned on
their facts. The two cases, however, concerned highly typical under-
cover investigations in which a participational ruse served as the
medium for consent. If misplaced confidence may exempt these two
cases from the purview of the fourth amendment, why should it not
remove any other forms of misplaced confidence?
If the undercover preogative was conceptually limitable under
present law to merely participational schemes, the consent rule
would survive, albeit under the weight of a major exception. The
judicial leap under present law, however, to allow nonparticipa-
tional deception was not long in coming among the lower courts
after White. In United States v. Guidry, "I the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held a search legal where a federal agent imperson-
ated a printing press repairman and thereby gained entry into the
defendant's home. No search warrant was procured. While inside
the house, the agent viewed the premises and by removing a piece
180. New York City's Bureau of Special Services Investigations "wiretapped, infiltrated,
bugged, photographed, surveyed, investigated, spied, and unshamefully undertook any strat-
egy that enabled it to do its job effectively. The unit was kept to only one restraint: the
Bureau had to obey the law punctiliously." A. BOUZA, supra note 6, at 23.
181. For cases which follow Lewis on basically the same factual pattern, see United
States v. Ressler, 536 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 145
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974); United States v. Boggus, 411 F.2d 110 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 919 (1969); United States v. Hayden, 397 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1027 (1970); Patterson v. People, 168 Colo. 417, 451 P.2d 445 (1969);
Metzler v. State, 229 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); People v. Favela, 31 Ill. App. 3d 453,
333 N.E.2d 284 (App. Ct. 1975); Killie v. State, 14 Md. App. 465, 287 A.2d 310 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1972); State v. Anglada, 144 N.J. Super. 358, 365 A.2d 720 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);
State v. Goeller, 264 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1972) (most cogent decision yet by state court); State
v. Sabbot, 16 Wash. App. 929, 561 P.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Duarte, 4 Wash. App.
825, 484 P.2d 1156 (Ct. App. 1971).
182. 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976); See United States v. DeFeis, 530 F.2d 14 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied sub nor. Ennis v. United States, 417 U.S. 915 (1974); United States v. Bradley,
455 F.2d 1181, 1186 (1st Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 605 (1973); Creps v. State,
94 Nev. -, 581 P.2d 842 (Nev. 1978).
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of green printed paper, confirmed the government's suspicions that
the defendants were engaged in a counterfeiting operation. A few
minutes after the agent left the house, a small fire was started near
the carport. Officials, who had been on continuous outside surveil-
lance, summoned the fire department and rushed into the house to
"search the house for fire."' 3 While in the house, they saw the
counterfeiting machinery, made the arrests and seized the evi-
dence."'
The court considered the initial entry and search by the under-
cover agent legal under the authority of Lewis. 5 The close nexus
between the later pretextual search of the house during the fire and
the earlier undercover search, would have most likely "tainted" the
later search had the court determined the earlier search to be ille-
gal. 8 For that reason, the court's determination concerning the first
search was not dicta. More important is the fact that this under-
cover surveillance was achieved through a nonparticipational de-
ception. The court, however, made absolutely no distinction on this
basis and viewed the search in Guidry as indistinguishable from
that in Lewis. Thus, the government may, in the guise of a milkman
or dry cleaner, pry into the confines of the home on the thin pre-
scription of misplaced trust.
In an appeal of a petition for habeas corpus relief, the Third
Circuit also extended Lewis and White to a situation that should not
have fallen within the category of undercover investigation. In
Brown v. Brierley, "7 the defendant was convinced by police officers,
whom he knew to be officers, to turn over a revolver for the stated
purpose of selling it to raise funds for the defendant. The officers
did sell the gun for the defendant's benefit, but immediately bor-
rowed the revolver from the purchaser and subjected it to a ballistics
test. The officers admitted that when they promised to act as the
defendant's agent, they had the undisclosed intention to procure the
weapon for testing. 8 Based on evidence derived from the test, the
government successfully prosecuted the defendant for murder.
Thus, the porous nature of the Lewis holding was again appar-
183. Id. at 1221.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1222.
186. The court considered the subsequent search and seizure clearly pretextual in regard
to the claim by the government that the seizures were made in the course of searching for
the fire. The seizure was held valid, however, on the grounds that it preserved evidence from
destruction. Id.
187. 438 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1971),.cert. denied, 402 U.S. 997 (1972).
188. Id. at 956.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ent when the Third Circuit held the Brown seizure valid upon the
force of the arguments in Lewis. "8 It is questionable, however,
whether the facts in Brown fit within the definition of "undercover."
Although the deception was not effected through a participational
scheme, it is clear that the police activity in Brown was open govern-
mental deception not comprehendible within the undercover pre-
rogative. Yet under the force of Lewis, the misrepresentation was
validated.
The undercover rationale virtually obliterated the consent rule
in Raines v. United States. 0 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit followed Lewis in validating an entry gained under circum-
stances previously considered illegal. The record showed there was
sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant,' and there
was enough time to procure such warrant. Nonetheless, outside the
premises, a police officer, impersonating an acquaintance of the
defendant, spoke to the defendant within. Based upon the state-
ments made, the defendant opened the door wide enough for the
officer to step in. Other police officers immediately entered and
searched the premises. They found contraband and made the arrest.
Again, by the authority of the undercover cases, the court held the
initial entry valid and even overlooked the coercive pressure exerted
upon the defendant after the support police entered.'
The rapid expansion of the undercover prerogative has not been
limited to the federal courts. The California Second District Court
of Appeal, in People v. Miller, 3 validated misrepresentation in a
case in which, prior to Lewis, it probably would have been held
illegal. In order to gain an observation of the interior of an apart-
ment, plainclothes police officers instructed the manager of the
apartments to announce at the door that the occupants had
"callers." The occupants opened the door, and the officers saw nar-
cotics paraphernalia."'
The court in Miller candidly reflected upon the precedential
distaste for governmental misrepresentation in consent searches,
but then admitted that since Lewis, such deception had become
189. Id. at 958-59; see United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Ennis v. United States, 417 U.S. 915 (1974).
190. 536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1977); see United States v.
Glassel, 488 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974).
191. 536 F.2d at 796, 799 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1977).
192. Id. at 799-802. Because probable cause for arrest also existed at the point of entry,
the court also addressed the issue of entry for arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970). See note
107 supra.
193. 248 Cal. App. 2d 731, 56 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
194. Id. at 735-36, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
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"perhaps not so bad, after all."' 5 In the court's view, deception had
become absolutely essential to police work and hence not unconsti-
tutional per se. In the case, the misrepresentation was material and
probably affirmative enough to be invalid under the relatively large
number of California cases prior to Lewis, which disallowed such
deception.' Yet, Lewis seemingly compelled the result even though
this activity was definitely nonparticipational and hardly
"undercover" work in any sense of the word as used in the under-
cover cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether any undercover prerogative should exist is a major
question in itself.'97 Assuming that it is necessary, to what extent
should it be used? The expansiveness of the post- White cases in the
Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits noted above illustrate how inade-
quate the undercover cases were in limiting the scope of governmen-
tal deception in consent searches. The undercover case holdings do
not compel the prerogative to extend to nonparticipational surveil-
lance. Unlimited deceit would unquestionably compromise the im-
portant limitation upon government comprehended in the fourth
amendment.9 8 In most jurisdictions, however, this is what is occur-
ing. A virtually irrebutable presumption has now arisen among the
lower courts that consent gained through governmental misrepre-
sentation is valid. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand,
have maintained a semblance of the consent rule.'99 Where the de-
ception is used in a participational scheme to penetrate narcotics
rings and bribery conspiracies, to name a few, these circuits will
indulge the undercover prerogative. Where nonparticipational ruses
are employed, the tendency is to hold to the consent rule.
The split in the circuits over this matter warrants a granting of
certiorari by the Supreme Court. The serious imbalances in fourth
amendment power caused by the indiscriminate use of governmen-
195. Id. at 738, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
196. See, e.g., People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391 P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1964).
197. For sources indicating the absolute necessity of undercover investigations in certain
fields of law enforcement, see notes 5, 6 & 13 supra. The parties in Lewis conceded that some
form of deception was necessary. 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966).
198. Deceit on the part of the police officer gains much of its power from the fact
that it issues from the lips of one supposedly above reproach and acting as govern-
ment official in his official capacity .. .one expects the "criminal" to lie, but
one does not expect an "officer of the law" to lie.
R. Buckner, The Police Culture of a Social Control Agency (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis
at University of California, Berkeley), reprinted in P. MANNING supra note 13, at 180.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977); note 107 supra.
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tal misrepresentation accentuate the need for settling the issue
along the lines already chosen by the Fifth Circuit. The undercover
prerogative of using deception to gain entry to private property is
undoubtedly justified as a "reasonable search" when serious crimes
would be otherwise impossible to detect. Organized crime, terrorist
groups and large scale narcotics activities, by their very nature,
demand participational deception as a means to gain consent. In
fact, this has been the standard method for accomplishing such
investigations, as was reflected in Lewis and White.
By distinguishing between participational and nonparticipa-
tional deception, the Court could limit the use of government misre-
presentation to cases in which it is absolutely necessary. The partic-
ipational distinction could be easily articulated in the manner done
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Lewis. 110 Where the
consent to enter is given for "proper purposes," that is, not to invite
participation in the crime, then the consent rule should apply.
Where the consent is given for "improper purposes," that is, to
invite participation, the undercover prerogative should apply. This
would reaffirm in greater part the consent rule by recognizing that
the undercover power is an exception to the rule, not the rule itself.
200. 352 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1965), affd, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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